具有出色抗干扰能力的GNSS接收机:挪威JammerTest的结果

JammerTest 2023 - 2024 - picture taken by David Jensen @jensenmedia

                                                                                                                                        本文还提供简体中文版本

全球范围内,对提高PNT(定位、导航、时间)系统韧性的需求日益增加。美国总统签署了一项行政命令,旨在通过PNT服务增强国家韧性。地缘政治紧张局势要求在有争议的GNSS条件下,在导航战 (NAVWAR) 地区的行动具有更高水平的安全性。芬兰等国家的公司正在寻找能够联网检测恶意干扰源的强大接收机。对于许多GNSS应用(如参考网络、无人机监视或配送以及时间同步)来说,PNT性能下降或丢失的后果不堪设想。也因如此,这些关键任务应用中使用的GNSS接收机必须具备最高级别的抗干扰韧性,才能在充满挑战的环境中稳健运行。

AIM+抗干扰和防欺骗对抗实时GNSS干扰

Septentrio接收机具有出色的抗干扰能力,可抵御有意和无意的GNSS干扰欺骗*。在实时干扰条件下测试接收机技术对于验证和持续改进抗干扰和防欺骗算法至关重要。这就是为什么Septentrio参加了挪威政府在偏远的安岛举办的大规模JammerTest 2023活动,目的是为了在受控环境中进行实时干扰测试。Septentrio定期参加此类测试活动,但大多数此类活动都是机密的,结果不能公开分享。JammerTest是首批鼓励分享结果的此类公开活动之一。

在挪威进行了5天的密集测试后,AIM+抗干扰和防欺骗技术被证明在实时干扰条件下有效。测试结果表明,在实际干扰下,接收机技术起着关键作用,而天线技术起着辅助作用。通过在各种类型的欺骗攻击下测试接收机,结果表明,最佳的欺骗防护在于让多种反欺骗机制协同工作。

大型航空航天和国防公司萨博也参加了JammerTest活动,并验证了Septentrio接收机在其要求严格的空中交通管理系统中的韧性。

尽管他们可能没有意识到这一点,但每年有数亿乘客依靠萨博的空中交通管理系统安全到达目的地。这些系统中的大多数又依靠GPS/GNSS进行定位和时间同步。鉴于此事的重要性,萨博深感自豪能够利用Septentrio设备,提供一流的防欺骗和抗干扰技术。萨博和Septentrio最近在JammerTest上的合作展示了我们合作的有效性。

Saab-logo
Robert Brown
萨博空中交通管理产品组合、销售和战略总监

Results from JammerTest 2024

GPS-Jamming-test-Sepentrio-versus-competition-during-JammerTest-2024
Figure 1: Septentrio receiver (orange) is not jammed even by very powerful interference, while two competitor receivers (red, blue) show wrong positions.

在此次测试中使用了“点烟器”干扰器,这是最常见的干扰器类型之一,可以很容易地在网上购买到。它发射功率在10-15 dBm之间的信号,干扰GPS L1、L2信号。其他干扰测试包括信号强度比GNSS信号高1千万倍的高功率干扰器。 

下图显示了使用“点烟器”低功率干扰器进行的移动干扰测试的结果。信噪比时间图显示,当干扰开始时,跟踪的GNSS信号的质量会下降。如上图所示,Septentrio接收机能够继续跟踪信号并输出定位,而其他接收机会在一段时间内失去定位。 

Spoof-proof GNSS receivers

The image below shows a meaconing test where Septentrio receiver performance is compared to a high-end competition receiver. Meaconing is a form of spoofing where GNSS signals are recorded and then retransmitted with a time delay. The spoofed receiver then “believes” it is at the location of the antenna that was used to record the GNSS signal. During the test, as the car traveled along a coastal road, the Septentrio receiver (orange line) maintained accurate positioning. In contrast, the competitor receiver (red line) was spoofed, reporting its location on a mountain - the site of the interference transmission antenna used in the JammerTest, as shown in this article's cover image. 

meaconing-septentrio-versus-competition-during-JammerTest-2024
Figure 2: Car test shows that a Septentrio receiver (orange) is resilient to GNSS spoofing of type meaconing, while competitor receiver is spoofed to the top of the hill.

Danger: Spoofed positions without a warning

GPS-spoofing-stats-Sepentrio-versus-competition-during-JammerTest-2024
Fig. 3 : The combination of high GNSS spoofing mitigation (green) & spoofing detection (red, flagged) demonstrates that Septentrio receivers are reliable during various types of spoofing attacks, as compared to 4 other RTK competitor receivers.

This graph shows a summary of performance of various receivers during spoofing testing throughout the 5-day event. The green sections represent the percentage of correct positions or successful spoofing mitigation. Grey indicates the percentage of time the receiver reported no position during spoofing, and red shows the percentage of time the receiver displayed spoofed positions.

The Septentrio receiver showed minimal spoofed positioning, even under sophisticated spoofing attacks, and consistently detected and flagged spoofing when it occurred, demonstrating situational awareness. In contrast, three competitor receivers failed to flag spoofing in many cases, displaying erroneous positions without warning the system of potential risks. 

GPS-time-spoofing-test-Sepentrio-versus-competition-during-JammerTest-2024
Fig. 4 : As GNSS time is spoofed, the Septentrio receiver keeps delivering correct timing information, while a competition receiver shows incorrect time.

Resilience of GNSS timing validated

The plot below shows results from a test where GNSS time was spoofed. The Septentrio receiver maintained accurate timing, while a competitor receiver was spoofed and displayed incorrect time. Applications such as telecom, power grids, and financial institutions depend on precise GNSS timing. Malicious spoofing can result in outages, with total costs reaching millions of dollars or euros. Investing in resilient GNSS technology is essential to protect mission-critical systems and the users who depend on them.
 

Multi-layered receiver protection pays off

During JammerTest 2024, Septentrio receivers with AIM+ technology demonstrated exceptional resilience to high-powered jammers and various types of spoofing. This performance reflects over 25 years of expertise in developing reliable GNSS positioning technology, incorporating multiple layers of protection:

  • Multi-frequency technology for signal diversity, ensuring fallback during jamming or spoofing
  • Cryptographic signal authentication (OSNMAto verify genuine signals
  • Anomaly detection powered by continuously updated big data from years of field observations  

As seen on the news, GNSS spoofing is increasingly common due to readily available transmitter hardware and signal simulator software. Spoofing poses an even greater risk than jamming, as it can not only disrupt operations but also manipulate navigation systems, potentially resulting in planned collisions or theftSecuring your system at the receiver core is the most effective strategy to ensure resilient, reliable operation.

Learn more about AIM+ Anti-Spoofing technology or download our comprehensive GNSS Spoofing brochure. The video below is a summary of Septentrio’s results from JammerTest 2024. Feel free to share this video with those interested in resilient and reliable positioning. 

Tried, tested and true

Always accurate and available Positioning, Navigation and Time or Assured PNT is key to successful industrial or critical operations in challenging environments. By regularly participating in live events such as the JammerTest, Septentrio's anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technology is continuously being tested and improved to withstand the latest interference attacks. This technology has also been confirmed to be effective by users out in the field, who are using Septentrio receivers in places of malicious interference, such as near contested borders.  

Although an anti-jam antenna can play a role in hardening the system, the most effective approach to securing your system is to use a receiver with advanced anti-spoofing and anti-jamming (AJAS) protection. For spoofing this means including several layers of protection which shield the receiver from various types of attacks. Septentrio receivers come in various formats from rugged boxes to OEM boards and compact modules, like the low-weight, low-power mosaic-X5 module receiver, which is also easy to integrate and is compatible with popular autopilots like Pixhawk, ArduPilot and PX4 Autopilot. For more information about resilient GNSS receivers and technology please contact Septentrio

 

Septentrio GNSS receivers vs competition at JammerTest 2023
图 1 在实时干扰中,测试车上的 Septentrio 接收机可提供准确定位,而友商的接收机则会在一段时间后失去定位。

AIM+ detects and mitigates GNSS jamming

The figure on the right shows that during jamming a Septentrio GNSS receiver in a car delivered accurate positioning along the whole route (orange track), while a high-end GNSS/INS competition receiver lost positioning two times (red track). 

GPS jammer device
图 2:在干扰汽车的动态测试中使用的"点烟器 "类型干扰器。图片来源:Testnor。

During this test a “cigarette” jammer was used, which is one of the most common types of jammers and can easily be purchased online. It emits signals with power between 10-15 dBm and jams GPS L1, L2 signals. Other jamming tests included highly powerful jammers with signals 10 million times more powerful than GNSS signals.  

The plot below shows results of a mobile jamming test performed with the “cigarette” low-power jammer. The signal-to-noise time plot shows that when jamming is started the quality of the tracked GNSS signals decreases. A Septentrio receiver, shown at the top continues to track the signals and to output positioning, while a competition receiver loses positioning for a period of time. 

Signal quality plot
图 3:随着 GNSS 信号开始受到干扰,其质量会下降,如该信噪图所示。 Septentrio接收器保持跟踪和定位,而竞赛接收器在一段时间内失去定位。

Over the 1-day period of intensive jamming tests, receivers with AIM+ demonstrated 99,5% positioning availability under various forms of jamming from simple continuous narrow-band interference to the most complex wide-band transmissions.

The magic is in the GNSS receiver

For mission-critical applications an anti-jam antenna can play a role in achieving maximum resilience against RF interference. During the JammerTest, 3 receivers were tested under heavy multi-frequency wideband jamming in combination with antennas of varying sophistication. The signal-to-noise time plots below show signal quality during this test. In the top plot, a receiver with a standard wideband helical antenna does not have AIM+ anti-jamming technology and so immediately loses tracking of satellite signals during jamming. A receiver with the same antenna, but with AIM+ continues to track signals and deliver positioning (middle plot). The bottom plot shows a receiver with AIM+ coupled with an anti-jam antenna. The drop in signal quality is slightly less than with a standard antenna and the receiver continues to track signals and to deliver positioning. 

 

Antenna-comparison-receiver-with-without-AIM+ septentrio
图 3:“点烟器”类型干扰测试结果

相关手册

Tests with various anti-jam antennas showed interference reduction of about 10 dB due to the antenna. While advanced anti-jam technology like AIM+ plays a key role in positioning availability under jamming, an antenna plays a supporting role and can improve the chances of getting positioning in cases where the jamming is still slightly stronger than the ability of the receiver to mitigate it. While anti-jam antennas can be effective for wide-band “white-noise” jamming they are less effective for other types of jamming.

Comprehensive anti-spoofing requires multiple layers of protection

Hackers employ various types of spoofing to hijack positioning, navigation or time, from simple asynchronous spoofing to sophisticated synchronous types which are almost identical to real GNSS signals. For the highest degree of anti-spoofing protection and situational awareness a receiver requires several layers of protection (find out more in our GPS Spoofing brochure).

AIM+ detects, flags and mitigates GNSS spoofing 

The plots below show positioning of several different receivers in a moving car during a GNSS spoofing attack.